Abstract-For a Linear Time-Invariant (LTI) system, a network of observers is considered where through asynchronous (with bounded delay) communications, they all obtain the state variables of the LTI system. In such setting, a new type of adversarial nodes might affect the observation process by impersonating the identity of the regular nodes, which is a violation against communication authenticity. These adversaries also inherit the capabilities of Byzantine nodes making them more powerful threats called smart spoofers. We show how asynchronous networks are vulnerable to smart spoofing attack. In the estimation scheme considered in this paper, the estimated state variables are flowed from the sets of source nodes, which can detect a portion of the state variables each, to the other follower nodes. The regular nodes, to avoid getting misguided by the impersonation threats, distributively filter the extreme values received from the nodes in their neighborhood. A topological condition based on graph strong robustness is obtained to guarantee the convergence. Two simulation scenarios are provided to verify the results.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
ECURITY is becoming an increasingly important concern for stability and safety of networked control systems. Nowadays, in large-scale control systems, communication channels connecting various physical components for realtime measurement and control mostly make use of general purpose cyber-networks such as the Internet and wireless networks, which create vulnerabilities to adversarial intrusions. While conventional network security-based measures may be partially effective, novel resiliency methods explicitly taking dynamical nature of physical components into account should be developed as any failure in security of the cyber components in such systems may turn into irrecoverable harms to the physical infrastructure.
Security experts define various security goals including (i) Confidentiality, ensuring privacy of important data against outside eavesdroppers; (ii) Integrity, maintaining fidelity of system signals; (iii) Availability, capability of timely having access to the required signals; (iv) Authenticity, verifying the identity of each signal; (v) Authorization, adjusting legitimacy of access by each component to other parts of the system; and (vi) Accountability, detection of any potential attacks and faults in the system [1] .
In this paper, we consider masquerading, spoofing, or impersonation attack strategy on cyber-physical networked systems, Mostafa Safi is with the Aerospace Engineering Department, Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran, halebi@aut.ac.ir and Seyed Mehran Dibaji is with the Department of Mechanical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technolgy, Cambridge, MA, USA, dibaji@mit.edu.
which is a threat of authenticity. In literature, mostly, the spoofing attack is concerned in the interactions between only two agents: a spoofer and a normal. For example, [2] presents an application of spatial processing methods for GPS spoofing detection and mitigation. Also, a GPS spoofing scenario is formulated as a constrained optimization problem and an effective solution is provided to compute the falsified GPS measurement of each time instant [3] . Moreover, vulnerability of an unmanned vehicle to deceptive GPS signals, is considered in theory and practice [4] . The false-data injection attacks to unmanned vehicles and confiscating its control system is investigated in [5] . This differs a little from spoofing attacks. The attacker masquerade as disturbance for the control system of the vehicle and deviates its path smoothly. Furthermore, a game-theoretic approach is developed in [6] to counteract the spoofing attacks. The common point all the above researches share is that there is no network of agents. Only two-side interplay scenarios are considered, where the spoofing or masquerading is the attacking method. Recently though, [7] and [8] focused on the sequels of spoofing attack on the network of agents. However, the physical fingerprint of communication signals and signal processing techniques are used to undo the attacks. Here, we investigate the problem in the cases that the attacker could break any type of encrypted signals which makes it possible to perform masquerading. Particularly, our emphasis is on the resiliency of a network in terms of its topology which is a more basic level of counteraction to the threat. Moreover, we combine adversarial capabilities of the so-called Byzantine model, which is an integrity attack capable of sending inconsistent erroneous signals to the receivers [9] , [10] , with spoofing, that is use of other nodes' identity to send data on their behalf, and introduce a novel and more powerful adversarial model called smart spoofer. In [11] , resiliency of synchronous networks is investigated against mobile Byzantine adversaries that are different from our adversarial model. In our setting, smart spoofers can use the asynchrony of network communications to mislead the nodes with impersonated identities.
Spoof-resiliency techniques would be applicable and useful in a broad range of wired and wireless networks including sensor networks, in-vehicle networks, and Internet-based networks. For instance, the reader can refer to [12] for a GPSbased network, [7] for multi-robot networks, and [13] for CAN-based networks susceptible to be threatened by smart spoofers. In particular, [7] studies Sybil attacks where the attackers by jamming the server with fake identities cause an availability threat, which is a special case of our adversarial model.
One of the targets of spoofers in network systems would be inserting erroneous values into the distributed state estimations
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performed by the nodes. Distributed state estimation algorithms are extensively studied in the literature [14] - [17] . However, most of the works focused on the interaction between dynamic system properties, observers and the graph topology. For example, a minimum cost communication graph which enables limited communication for decentralized estimation is investigated in [8] . The interplay between network connectivity, global observability, and system instability is studied in [14] . Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of distributed observers are studied in [15] . Also, [16] generalizes the distributed observer design for LTI systems with singular transition matrices. The resilience of such algorithms against cyber attacks has recently received more attention. For instance, the resiliency of LTI systems has been investigated in [18] against Byzantine attacks.
In the current paper, we consider impersonation on a network of distributed observers for an LTI system. Like the settings of [19] , [20] , the observers communicate with bounded delays and asynchrony and moreover must deal with much stronger attacks, i.e. smart spoofing. Similar to [18] , [21] , the regular (un-attacked) nodes are partitioned to source nodes and follower nodes, where source nodes can detect the corresponding eigenvalues and via distributively constructing a directed acyclic graph (DAG), the associated state estimates disseminate through the network. In both DAG construction and estimation propagation, smart spoofers interfere to avoid convergence. We utilize an approach based on local filtering to defend against smart spoofing, turning into sufficient conditions on network topology based on graph robustness which is a connectivity measure (see [10] , [22] for application of similar filtering algorithms in consensus). Consistency of the defined spoofing model with the network security literature, consideration of delays, asynchrony, and accurate assumptions in network communications make our proposed algorithms, update rule, and concluding results more practical in real world applications. Furthermore, despite [7] , in our work the attackers do not leave any sign and thus the regular nodes cannot identify them. In the development of our results and the proofs, we adopted the concept of motifs, the smallest possible subgraphs of the original network with certain properties, as a new proof technique. We analyze how the information is disseminated through the motifs.
The paper is organized as follows. The preliminaries and problem statement come in section II. In section III, we take a look at the resilient distributed estimation scheme and the local filtering-based algorithm that we used in this paper. Our main results are presented in Section IV. We put forward the simulation results in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper and discuss the future tendency of the research in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Notations 1) Graph Theory: A directed graph is represented by G = (V, E), where the set of nodes and edges are represented by V = {1, . . . , N } and E ⊆ V × V respectively. An edge from node j pointing to node i implies data transmission from node j to node i and is denoted by (j, i). The neighbourhood of the Physical Layer Fig. 1 . A typical cyber-physical system: In the physical layer, the plant dynamic (maybe unstable in some modes) propagates over time. In the cyber layer, the plant's outputs are monitored by a network of distributed observers (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , RN ) while only some of them are directly connected to the plant. The network is threatened by adversarial units (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s f ).
i-th node is defined by the set N i = {j|(j, i) ∈ E}. A node j is said to be an outgoing neighbour of node i if (i, j) ∈ E. A spanning sub-graph for G is a sub-graph of G which contains every vertex of G.
The length of a path is measured by its number of edges. A cycle is a sequence
A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a directed graph which has no cycles.
For the consensus-based state estimation rule designed in the paper, the critical topological notion is graph robustness, which is a connectivity measure of graphs (see [23] ). Definition 1. (r-reachable set) For a graph G = (V, E) and a set C ⊂ V, we say that C is an r-reachable set if there exists an i ∈ C such that |N i \ C| ≥ r, where r ∈ N + . Definition 2. (Strongly r-robust w.r.t. S) For a graph G = (V, E), a set of nodes S ⊂ V and r ∈ N + , we say that G is strongly r-robust with respect to S, if for any non-empty subset C ⊆ V \ S, C is r-reachable.
2) Linear Algebra: The set of all eigenvalues of a matrix A is denoted by σ(A). The set of all marginally stable and unstable eigenvalues of a matrix A is denoted by σ U (A) = {λ ∈ σ(A)||λ| ≥ 1}. We use a A (λ) and g A (λ) to denote the algebraic and geometric multiplicities, respectively, of an eigenvalue λ ∈ σ(A). An eigenvalue λ is said to be simple if a A (λ) = g A (λ) = 1.
B. System Dynamics and Distributed Observers
Consider the following discrete-time LTI system
where k ∈ N is the discrete-time index, x[k] ∈ R n is the state vector and A ∈ R n×n is the system matrix. The system is observed by an N -node network G = (V, E). Access of the i-th node to the measurement of time instant k is given by
where y i [k] ∈ R ri and C i ∈ R ri×n . For computational or control purposes, each node needs to estimate the entire system state x[k]. Nodes of the network G are called distributed observers if they maintain and update the estimates using only their own measurements and those received from their neighbours. Fig. 1 shows the layout of a typical cyber-physical system threatened by adversarial units. Letx i [k] denote the state estimate of node i at each time step k. The following definition describes the objective of the distributed estimation scheme.
Definition 3. (Omniscience) Over the N -node network G, the distributed observers are said to achieve omniscience if
C. Adversarial Model
We consider an adversarial model that is able to threaten the following system protection services: authentication, authorization, confidentiality, integrity and availability. In what follows, we formally define the abilities of such an adversarial node. 1) The adversarial node can have complete knowledge about the topology, plant dynamics, and information flow over the network at all time steps. 2) The adversarial node can refuse to perform any preassigned algorithm and can send arbitrary values to each of its neighbours at the same time step.
3) The adversarial node can send its data with intended delays and asynchrony. 4) The adversarial node can impersonate other nodes and send arbitrary data with their identities.
The first two actions are performed by Byzantine adversaries, while the last one is performed by a threat called spoofing or masquerading in [1] that directly threatens the authentication among systems' protection services. In fact, the introduced adversarial model is an advanced spoofing threat with additional capabilities of Byzantine adversaries that we call smart spoofing. Note that we use the terms "spoof" and "impersonate" interchangeably in the paper.
It is apparent that no distributed estimation algorithm would succeed if all the nodes are adversarial. So, the set of nodes V is partitioned into two subsets of regular nodes and adversarial nodes denoted by R and A = V \ R, respectively. In the literature dealing with distributed fault-tolerant algorithms, a common assumption is to assign an upper bound f to the total number of adversarial nodes in the network, which is known as f -total adversarial model. To consider a large number of adversaries in large scale networks, locally bounded fault models are used, as in [24] , defined below.
Definition 5. (f -local smart spoofer model) A set A of smart spoofers is f -locally bounded if it contains at most f smart spoofers in the neighbourhood of any of the regular nodes, i.e.
Similarly, any distributed estimation algorithm fails if a smart spoofer can impersonate all the network nodes. Thus, to tackle the problem, we impose an upper bound for the number of nodes that smart spoofers can send data on their behalf as follows.
Definition 6. (Capacity of smart spoofers) The maximum number of nodes that a smart spoofer can send data on their behalf at each time step, including itself, represents its capacity and is denoted by α ≥ 1.
D. Problem Statement
In this paper, we aim to evaluate previous results on the standard omniscience problem by considering much more advanced adversarial model and more challenging constraints on the network communications. Accordingly, we set the following assumptions on the network communications protocol which bring up and remark the practical aspects of our results. Assumption 1. All nodes update by a global clock. This means that the sampling time T is the same for all observers.
Assumption 2. All nodes communicate through serial links and have access to only the last data packet they have received from neighbor nodes. Referring to the introduced LTI dynamical system and the observation model of the network, we put forth a more complicated version of the standard omniscience problem (Definition 3) in the following definition. Definition 7. (Resilient Omniscience) Given a system dynamics of the form (1), a network represented by the graph G, and an observer model at each node given by (2), a state estimation design is said to achieve resilient omniscience if
regardless of the actions of any f -locally bounded set of smart spoofers.
The problem dealt with in this paper is the design of a distributed estimation scheme proper to cope with smart spoofers threatening a given cyber network observing an LTI system. For this purpose, based on the assumptions on the network communications protocol and the smart spoofer adversarial model, we first present the distributed estimation scheme under a specific network topology. Next, we analyse the required constraints on the graph topology which guarantee resilient omniscience by all regular nodes using the proposed estimation law in the network.
III. RESILIENT DISTRIBUTED OBSERVERS
Under Byzantine adversarial model introduced in [9] , the network achieves omniscience by distributed observers proposed in [18] . The design performs observation task by separating detectable and undetectable eigenvalues of the system and the related states. Here, we use a similar scheme with a different distributed estimation rule proper for resilient omniscience defined in Definition 7. To this end, consider a Jordan canonical decomposition of state transition matrix A with the following assumption on its eigenvalues. This assumption is made for sake of simplicity and can be relaxed with the techniques introduced in [18] . This assumption allows us to diagonalize A by the coordinate transformation matrix Ψ = [ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ], where ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n are n linearly independent eigenvectors of A. With (1) is transformed into the form
The eigenvalues ofĀ (which are the same as those of A) are denoted by λ 1 , . . . , λ n . Each regular node i distinguishes its detectable and undetectable eigenvalues by PBH test and divides them into the sets D i and U i , respectively. Also, the set of regular nodes are partitioned into sets of source nodes and follower nodes as defined below.
Definition 8.
(Source nodes and follower nodes) For each λ j ∈ σ U (A), the set of nodes that can detect λ j is denoted by S j , and is called the set of source nodes for λ j . The rest of the nodes are called follower nodes.
Each regular node, depending on being a source node or a follower node for λ j , adopts a different strategy for estimating the related states.
A. State Estimation by Source Nodes
Each regular node i relies on its own measurements and uses a Luenberger observer to estimate a portion of the states associated to λ j ∈ D i . In fact, regular node i is a source node for each λ j ∈ D i . To this end, letC 
where
is the observer gain matrix of node i for
B. Distributed State Estimation by Follower Nodes
A regular node i cannot estimate a portion of the states associated with its undetectable eigenvalues of the system. In fact, the regular node i is a follower node in estimating the substate related to the eigenvalues λ j ∈ U i and needs to receive information from its neighbours through a directed acyclic graph for each λ j (defined later) rooted in the set of associated source nodes. In what follows, we propose an updating rule for the follower node i accomplishing its estimation task in a network with communication delays and partial asynchrony 1 . Combining the ideas behind the consensus update rules in [18] and [20] , we present a novel update rule with the following algorithm based on local filtering method for node i to update its own state estimate for λ j ∈ U i . 1) Each regular node i, at each time step k when it wants to update its estimate, gathers the state estimate of z j [k] lastly received from only the nodes in
represents the set of neighbors in the DAG related to λ j that is selected by Algorithm 1 for each regular node i, which will be proposed later) and arranges them from the largest to the smallest. 2) Node i drops the largest and smallest (β + 1)f estimates (β will be defined later) and executes the following update rule:
is the time delay of the last data packet that node i has received from node until time instant k (it may be time-varying), 
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we provide the main results of the paper giving the analysis of the spoof-resilient distributed estimation strategy and the topology constraints under which our adopted algorithms and update rule succeed.
First, we consider how harsh the misbehaviour effects of a smart spoofer would be in the network. In Definition 6, we introduced the spoofing capacity in each time step. In the following lemma, we generalize capacity of smart spoofers for a period of time.
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 3 hold and capacity of a smart spoofer be α. Then, each smart spoofer is able to send data on behalf of β = αk−1 regular nodes within each consecutivē k steps.
Proof. According to Definition 6, a smart spoofer can send data on behalf of α nodes including itself at each time step. Also, according to Assumption 3, all nodes have to make at least one update within consecutivek steps note that if a node does not follow this rule can be detected as an adversarial node by the regular nodes). Consider the time interval k + 1 ≤ t ≤ k +k. Let the smart spoofer choose to make an update with its own identity at t = k s , where k +1 ≤ k s ≤ k +k. Considering each consecutivek steps, the smart spoofer s has α−1 capacity for impersonation at k s and α capacity in otherk − 1 steps. Therefore, the smart spoofer is able to impersonate αk − 1 nodes overall withink steps, i.e. α−1+α(k−1) = αk−1.
In fact, Lemma 1 indicates that we cannot simply replace the smart spoofers and impersonated nodes with Byzantine nodes. Because the key question is that how many Byzantine nodes have the same effect of a smart spoofer with capacity α. This is what we mathematically clarified in Lemma 1. Asynchrony lets the adversarial nodes spoof a specific number of regular nodes within eachk time-steps. Besides, from adversarial nodes' perspective, this spoofing (and sending false data packets) must be continued for all the future time -in everyk steps -in order to be effective. Thus, the distributed algorithms of regular nodes must be modified to be resilient against the attack. In other words, network providers need to be aware that in a network with asynchrony (almost all the networks are practically asynchronous), there is the possibility of stronger attacks than Byzantine attack. The following necessary condition on the network communications formally states when a smart spoofer can impersonate regular nodes. Proposition 1. Consider a network of nodes interconnected by the graph G. Suppose that smart spoofers are able to impersonate, at least, one regular node within each consecutivē k steps (β > 0). For each regular node i ∈ R, a smart spoofer s ∈ N j i can impersonate a regular node ∈ N j i ∩ R at a time instant t > k only if the packet which is broadcast by node at time instant t = k is received by node i with delay
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Considering Assumption 1, let node ∈ N j i broadcast a data packet at t = k and node i ∈ R receives the packet at the same time (τ i [k] = 0) and use it for its next update at the same time ( k i [k] = 0). Also, suppose that smart spoofer s decides to impersonate node for node i. There are two possibilities for the arrival time of the packet sent by s to i. The packet can arrive either before or after the time t = k (the time instant t = k is excluded as it contradicts the Assumption 2). In case the packet sent by s arrives at any time t > k, the node i has already accepted the last packet it received, that is, the packet of node received at t = k, and has already made an update. Otherwise, if the packet sent by s arrives at any time t < k, then i will receive the packet sent by node at t = k and since, according to Assumption 2, all nodes only access the last data packet they receive. In either case, the smart spoofer s fails to spoof node i, which is a contradiction. This completes the proof.
Note that the necessary condition of Proposition 1 is independent of amounts of communication delays. This is because we would like to deal with smart spoofers that can impose arbitrarily bounded amount of delays on their links to the regular nodes, that is, if a smart spoofer wants to impersonate node ∈ N j i , it can arrange to send the packet to node i after node with appropriate delay so that it will be received after the packet sent by node . Then, node i accepts a packet sent by s with identity of node as it is the last packet received.
According to Proposition 1, the best case for the regular node i is that both k i [k] = 0 and τ i [k] = 0, so the smart spoofers in the neighborhood of i cannot impersonate neighbors of the node i. However, even if we suppose that k i [k] = 0, i.e. node i has not any lag in updating its estimate using the last data received from node , regular nodes cannot be sure about spoofing attack. In practice, the regular nodes cannot guess, before receiving a packet, whether it will be received with delay and, if so, how much the delay will be (although communication links' delays in real network systems are inevitable). Besides, as we said, smart spoofers can send data packets with intended delays. So, the regular nodes must be aware that all the communications may be done with delays in each time step. Therefore, to consider the worst case, we develop our further results on required topology constraints by assuming that the necessary condition on delays is satisfied for all time in the network.
A. Spoof-Resilient Mode Estimation Directed Acyclic Graph (SR-MEDAG)
Recall the local filtering for resilient consensus based estimation law (5) . Inspired by the algorithm presented in [18] , for construction of directed acyclic graphs associated with undetectable eigenvalues of an LTI system, we present a spoofresilient algorithm which is distributively executed by all the regular nodes. The overall distributed estimation scheme constitutes the construction of these sub-graphs and the prescribed local filtering-based algorithm which are performed in parallel. In what follows, we define the directed acyclic graphs that are paths for information flow over the network.
∩ R is the set of parent nodes of node i and L j m is the m-th layer of G j . In fact, for each λ j , we can organize the set of regular nodes of the graph G as a directed acyclic graph G j . In G j , the set of regular source nodes are denoted by L 
Node i updates c i (j) to 1, sets N j i = ∅, and broadcasts a message χ j (e.g. "110") to its neighbours. end if i ∈ V \ S j then if (c i (j) = 0, and node i has received m j from at least 2(β + 1)f + 1 distinct neighbours) then Node i updates c i (j) to 1, stores the labels of the neighbors from which it received χ j to N for at leastK j steps (later we prove thatK j is bounded). If node i was a follower node for λ j , i.e. i ∈ V \S j , it waits until it receives χ j from at least 2(β + 1)f + 1 distinct neighbors. Then, it sets c i (j) = 1, saves the indices of the neighbors from which it received χ j as N j i , begins and keeps broadcasting χ j to its neighbors for at leastK j steps. Finally, we say that SR-MEDAG construction algorithm terminates for node i if the counter value c i (j) = 1, ∀λ j ∈ σ U (A). Also, we say that SR-MEDAG construction phase terminates for λ j if the counter value c i (j) = 1, ∀i ∈ R.
Interestingly, it is not necessary for the regular nodes to knowK j (in that case, they have to execute the construction algorithm for all the future time not up toK j ). Indeed, each regular node i can begin updating its state estimates in parallel as soon as it sets c i (j) = 1 for λ j although the SR-MEDAG construction phase has not been terminated yet. However, we know that the construction phase will be terminated at some time instant in the future (bounded bȳ K j ) when all regular nodes will be able to update their own state estimates corresponding to each of the undetectable eigenvalues using the distributed consensus-based rule (5) . In this regard, consider that delay and asynchrony do not affect the output of the algorithm for each regular node i. Because node i waits until it receives the predefined message χ j from a specified number of nodes regardless of the time it takes. Indeed, asynchrony and bounded delays only postpone termination of the algorithm.
Furthermore, one may concern that some of the regular nodes are exposed to be impersonated by smart spoofers at any time while they are executing the construction algorithm. In fact, each smart spoofer not only can impersonate regular nodes (by sending arbitrary messages other than the true message χ j on behalf of them) but also can misbehave as follows:
i) It chooses to transmit any message different from the true message χ j from start to termination of the construction phase. ii) It transmits the true message before the counter value is triggered by a regular node. iii) It chooses not to transmit a message at all.
In the first case, regular nodes are able to identify the adversarial node as it goes against the rules of Algorithm 1. In the latter two cases, the adversarial node is undetectable by regular nodes relying just on local information. However, later we discuss constraints on the graph topology so that adversarial nodes fail to make any problem neither for the construction algorithm nor the estimation process.
It is noteworthy that the upper bound for the parameter K j in Algorithm 1 is a function of the parameter β, which is the capacity that asynchrony provides for smart spoofers to impersonate regular nodes. This upper bound would be different if we consider simply more Byzantine nodes instead of spoofers and impersonated nodes. Actually, another contribution of our paper with respect to [18] is the MEDAG construction algorithm and its convergence time. In the case of synchronous networks, each regular node updates only once and goes to sleep, while, in asynchronous networks, regular nodes have to continue updating up toK j time-steps in order to complete the SR-MEDAG construction.
In the following theorem, we show that the sub-graphs distributively found by the regular nodes, after termination of the construction phase, satisfy properties of the SR-MEDAG. Theorem 1. If the SR-MEDAG construction phase terminates for λ j ∈ σ U (A), there exists a sub-graph G j satisfying all the properties of an SR-MEDAG.
Proof. First, we prove by contradiction that the spanning subgraph G j is a directed acyclic graph. Suppose there is a directed cycle iP i, where i and the nodes in P belongs to R. The path P originates from i which changes its counter value c i (j) from 0 to 1 and begins transmitting χ j to its neighbors at a time instant t = k j i . Let the last node on the path P be . Clearly, node i receives data from node at a time instant t > k j i . As an edge from is pointing to node i, node i is supposed to receive the message χ j from node even when its counter value c i (j) is set to 1. This contradicts what node i has to do according to Algorithm 1. The same argument holds for every regular node belonging to G j . Next, we associate the notion of path length, referring to graph theory, to the found sub-graphs after the termination of the SR-MEDAG construction phase to show that the set R in We intentionally used the minimum number of variables to be communicated in SR-MEDAG so as to avoid potential masquerading threats caused by those variables. For example, it is not possible for regular nodes to realize their layer order in G j as they cannot identify which of their parent nodes are spoofed. To clarify this, consider a regular node i in L j m . The regular node has to receive 2(β +1)f +1 incoming edges from the nodes in m−1 r=0 L j r which broadcast their layer numbers so that the node i can realize its own layer number by sorting the received values and selecting the maximum as the previous layer number. However, smart spoofers can impersonate some of these nodes and send a wrong layer number behind of them. Thus, the node i can be deceived about the maximum layer number it received. Interestingly, in our method, there is no need that the regular nodes know their layer orders since they only needs to know 2(β + 1)f + 1 of their parent nodes to succeed in the estimation phase. Therefore, the construction algorithm can still be executed distributedly. Moreover, our strategy succeeds even if some of the source nodes in S j are smart spoofers.
B. Analysis of the Resilient Distributed Estimation Strategy
In this subsection, we introduce a repeating pattern subgraph which is used to simplify the analysis of our distributed estimation scheme. These sub-graphs are constructed and organized for each regular node according to its incoming edges from smart spoofers and other regular neighbors. Note that they may have overlaps in specific nodes and are defined as follows. {p r }, r = {1, 2, . . . , r}, and {h l }, l = {1, 2, . . . ,l}, where q and p r are the parent nodes of node i that are not impersonated and h l is a smart spoofer in N j i or an impersonated parent node of the node i. Then,
is a sub-graph of G j indicating the motif associated with h l and p r around the node i, where
We aim to associate each motif G j i to each node i to ensure that a smart spoofer or an impersonated node cannot deviate the estimation of the node i. In fact, each motif is the smallest sub-graph of G j which is resilient against Byzantine attacks. Note that impersonated regular nodes are potential Byzantine adversaries since smart spoofers can use their identities to send arbitrary values to their neighbours. Definition 11. (Independent and common nodes) Considerγ motifs associated with h l and p r around the regular node i denoted by G j i (l, r), r = 1, 2, . . . ,γ. Let p γ be a regular node in the set V i j (l, r), r = γ. Then, p γ is an independent node if p γ / ∈ V i j (l, r) ∀r = γ. A node that is not independent is called common.
The analysis strategy is to find the set of motifs around node i ∈ L j m such that they have only one common node. The following lemma determines the number of such motifs and investigates the possibility of this strategy (see Fig. 2 for an example).
Lemma 2. Consider the network G which contains an SR-MEDAG G j for each λ j ∈ σ U (A). There exist at least (β+1)f motifs around each regular node i ∈ L These regular nodes are parent nodes of i based on the second property of SR-MEDAG G j . According to Lemma 1, at most βf of these parent nodes may be impersonated by the smart spoofers. Thus, at most (β + 1)f of the nodes in N j i are whether smart spoofers or impersonated parent nodes of the node i which are partitioned as {h l }, l = {1, 2, . . . ,l}, i.e. l ≤ (β + 1)f . We can organize at least (β + 1)f + 1 of the remaining parent nodes, which cannot be impersonated, to construct the motifs around the node i. Based on Definition 10 and Definition 11, we pick a parent node q as a common node and leave the rest in the set of independent parent nodes {p r }, r = 1, 2, . . . , r, i.e. r ≥ (β + 1)f . Since r ≥l, we can find at least (β +1)f motifs around the regular node i such that all of them have one common parent node q and each associated with an independent parent node p r and a node h l . This completes the proof. Fig. 2 exhibits two overlapping motifs. In this example, there is a smart spoofer node around the regular node i, i.e. f = 1. Also, it is supposed that β = 1. Thus, according to Lemma 2, two motifs are found around node i. Note that smart spoofer s can impersonate node h, so a motif has to be constructed with the node h as the adversarial node. Also, node q is selected as the common node while p 1 and p 2 are the two independent parent nodes of node i.
Next, we use the notion of motifs to analyze estimation resilience of the network G enhanced by the distributed estimation update rule (5) at each node against the adversarial nodes in the presence of communication delays and asynchrony. We start with regular node i ∈ L j m and generalize our analysis to the whole network afterwards. Proof. Based on Lemma 2, node i has at most (β + 1)f potential threats and at least (β + 1)f motifs around node i such that they have one common node. Consider the motifs around node i: G j i (l, r), r = 1, 2, . . . , r, l = 1, 2, . . . ,l, where r ≥ (β + 1)f andl ≤ (β + 1)f . Let p r be an independent parent node of the node i, q the common parent node, and h l the potential Byzantine adversarial node in G j i (l, r), where the state estimation of p r and q converge to z j asymptotically for the state related to λ j . For simplicity of notations, we define
For each node i, at time instant k, we calculate the estimation error of node ∈ N j i for z j [k] by the last transmitted data to the node i:
. Also, the estimation error of the node i for z
Then, subtracting z j [k + 1] from both sides of (5) and noting that z (3), we derive the following equation from (5):
where we know that (6) 
In the former case, according to the local filtering algorithm, values of the node h l will be removed by setting ω ih l [k] = 0. From the latter case, we infer that e 
Now, we analyze resilience of the estimation of all the follower nodes in the whole network G with communication delays and asynchrony against f -local smart spoofer model.
Lemma 4.
Consider the network G which contains an SR-MEDAG G j for each λ j ∈ σ U (A). Then, for each regular node i ∈ R and each λ j ∈ U i , the local filteringbased algorithm governed by update rule (5) ensures that . Suppose that the regular node i has f incoming edges from adversarial nodes. Then, according to Lemma 2, we can find at least (β + 1)f motifs around node i with each of them having an independent regular source node from the set L j 0 . Each smart spoofer is able to impersonate at most βf parent nodes of i. So, there are at most (β + 1)f Byzantine adversarial nodes (including smart spoofers and impersonated regular nodes) around node i. However, we infer from Lemma 3 that the state estimate value of each adversarial node is trapped and sandwiched by one of the motifs according to the local filtering algorithm. Thus, the state estimate of node i converges to z j asymptotically.
Next, suppose the result holds for the regular nodes of all layers from 0 to m (where 1 ≤ m ≤ ξ j − 1). By induction, it is concluded that the result holds for all the regular nodes in L j m+1 as well based on the definition of SR-MEDAG.
Due to the linear dynamics of the local Luenberger observers for source nodes and since the estimation error of each follower node is a linear combination of its un-impersonated parents, we infer the following corollary about the convergence rate of the follower nodes' estimation error. Corollary 1. Estimation convergence rate of all the follower nodes in the network is exponential as the estimation error of the source nodes converges to 0 exponentially. Theorem 2. Consider the network G which contains an SR-MEDAG for each λ j ∈ σ U (A). Then, the distributed estimation scheme governed by the Luenberger observers described by (4) , and the local filtering-based algorithm governed by update rule (5), achieves resilient omniscience in the presence of communication delays and asynchrony under f -local smart spoofer model.
Proof. Based on the observable canonical decomposition represented by (3), for each regular node i, states of the dynamics system (1) are mapped and partitioned into two substates z Di [k] and z Ui [k] corresponding to the detectable and undetectable eigenvalues of the node i, respectively. Using the designed Luenberger observers,ẑ Di [k] converges to z Di [k] asymptotically. As an SR-MEDAG exists for each λ j ∈ σ U (A), the result of Lemma 4 also holds. Consequently, node i is able to estimate z Ui 
C. Spoof-Resilient Graph Topologies
In this subsection, we characterize graph topologies which ensures termination of the SR-MEDAG construction phase for each λ j ∈ σ U (A) under misbehavior of smart spoofers.
Lemma 5. The SR-MEDAG construction phase terminates for λ j ∈ σ U (A) if G is strongly 3(β + 1)f + 1 -robust w.r.t. S j .
Proof. Contradiction is used for the proof. Consider any λ j ∈ σ U (A) and let G be strongly 3(β + 1)f + 1 -robust w.r.t. the set of source nodes S j . If the SR-MEDAG construction phase does not terminate for λ j , there exists a set of regular nodes C ⊆ V \ S j which never update their counter values c i (j) from 0 to 1 for i ∈ C. As G is strongly 3(β + 1)f + 1 -robust w.r.t. S j , it follows that C is 3(β + 1)f + 1 -reachable, i.e., there exists a node i ∈ C which has at least 3(β + 1)f + 1 neighbours outside C. Under the f -local smart spoofer model, at most f of these nodes are smart spoofers which are able either to misbehave themselves or to impersonate βf regular nodes during the SR-MEDAG construction phase. So, at least, 2(β + 1)f + 1 of them are regular nodes with c i (j) = 1 which must have transmitted χ j to node i. Thus, node i must have changed c i (j) from 0 to 1 at some point of time, according to the rules of Algorithm 1. This is a contradiction.
Proposition 2.
Suppose that G is strongly 3(β + 1)f + 1 -robust w.r.t. S j , ∀λ j ∈ σ U (A), and let the SR-MEDAG construction phase starts at k = 0. Then,K j in Algorithm 1 is upper bounded byl j (η+1)k+τ +1 where η = β (τ −k)/k andl is length of the longest path of G j .
Proof. Since G is strongly 3(β + 1)f + 1 -robust w.r.t. S j , according to Lemma 5, each regular node has at least 2(β + 1)f + 1 parent nodes which remain safe from spoofing and transmit χ j at least once to the regular node. Each of these parent nodes has to make at least an update withink consecutive steps. We consider two separate cases: i)τ ≤k and ii)τ >k. Let node i be in L j 1 of G j . In the first case, each smart spoofer s ∈ N j i is able to impersonate at most βf parent nodes of node i in each consecutivek steps. So, the other 2(β + 1)f + 1 parent nodes will remain safe and transmit χ j to node i. For the second case, we consider the worst case where all these parent nodes postpone their updates byk − 1 steps and communicate to their neighbors withτ steps delay (because we are seeking the maximum time steps that a smart spoofer can prevent exactly 2(β + 1)f + 1 parent nodes to transmit χ j to their neighbors). Asτ >k, the smart spoofer has more η = β (τ −k)/k capacity after the first update to impersonate more parent nodes. However, they cannot do it permanently, i.e. at some time the parent nodes will transmit χ j to node i. Suppose that the smart spoofer use this additional capacity to impersonate just one additional parent node. In fact, η updates of this parent node will be spoofed which takes ηk time steps. Considering the firstk − 1 steps that the parent node may postpone its first update andτ steps delay of its last update, the overall time that the spoofed parent node succeeds to transmit χ j to node i will be (η + 1)k +τ + 1 steps. Now, consider the last node in the longest path of G j which is the last node that updates its counter value from 0 to 1. Let the length of the longest path of G j bel j and each node in this path updates its counter value from 0 to 1 after at most (η + 1)k +τ + 1. Then the maximum time needed for each regular node to keep transmitting χ j is bounded byl j (η + 1)k +τ + 1 .
Remark 2.
The maximum time that is needed for each regular node i ∈ L j m to keep transmitting χ j is bounded by (l j − m) (η + 1)k +τ + 1 . However, as the regular nodes cannot characterize their layer numbers, they have to keep transmitting the message χ j up toK j steps.
Finally, we propose the overall constraint on the network topology which makes sure that the network achieves resilient omniscience despite of smart spoofing actions.
Theorem 3. Resilient omniscience of a network with communication delays and asynchrony under f -local smart spoofer model is achieved using the proposed estimation scheme if G is strongly 3(β + 1)f + 1 -robust w.r.t. S j , ∀λ j ∈ σ U (A).
Proof. According to Lemma 5, the SR-MEDAG construction phase terminates for every undetectable eigenvalue λ j if G is strongly 3(β + 1)f + 1 -robust w.r.t. S j , ∀λ j ∈ σ U (A). Thus, based on Theorem 1, as SR-MEDAG exists for every λ j ∈ σ U (A). Finally, from Theorem 2, the existence of an SR-MEDAG for every λ j ∈ σ U (A) leads to resilient omniscience by using our proposed distributed estimation scheme in a network with communication delays and asynchrony under flocal smart spoofer model.
Remark 3.
Suppose that smart spoofers impersonate none of the regular nodes during SR-MEDAG construction phase. Then, the sufficient constraint on the network topology to achieve resilient omniscience is strongly 2(β + 1)f + 1 -robust w.r.t. S j , ∀λ j ∈ σ U (A).
Note that the presented sufficient conditions on the topology will be the same as the case of Byzantine attacks, proposed in [18] , if we set the parameter β = 0. It means that the estimation will converge for all regular nodes under a simpler topology, i.e. strongly (3f +1)-robust w.r.t. S j , ∀λ j ∈ σ U (A). This is consistent with the most important massage of our paper which asserts that asynchronous networks are more susceptible against cyber attacks; asynchronous networks can be threaten by adversaries that are stronger than Byzantine nodes, i.e. smart spoofers, which can use free time-steps between updates of regular nodes to impersonate some of them in order to mislead the others. Referring to Lemma 1, the capacity of smart spoofers for impersonating regular nodes is bounded within each consecutivek steps by β. Thus, the horizon parameterμ of timevarying graph G[k] has to satisfy the following inequality:
Note that, otherwise, each smart spoofer would have extra capacity to impersonate more than β regular nodes after each k steps. Now, the following result states the extension of our main result (Theorem 3) for the case of time-varying networks.
Corollary 2. Resilient omniscience of a network with communication delays and asynchrony under f -local smart spoofer model can be achieved using the proposed estimation scheme if G is jointly strongly 3(β +1)f +1 -robust w.r.t. S j , ∀λ j ∈ σ U (A), under the condition (7).
Similarly, reconsidering the case where smart spoofers do not impersonate any of the regular nodes during the SR-MEDAG construction phase, the following result holds for time-varying networks.
Corollary 3. Suppose that smart spoofers impersonate none of the regular nodes during SR-MEDAG construction phase. Then, the sufficient topology constraint on the network G[k] to achieve resilient omniscience is jointly strongly 2(β + 1)f + 1 -robust w.r.t. S j , ∀λ j ∈ σ U (A), with the condition (7).
These results follow from Lemmas 3 to 5 since in the proofs there, the time-invariant nature of the original graph G is not used.
2) Randomized Update Rule: Consider the case that each regular node, at each time instant, randomly decides whether to update its state estimate or not. That is, the follower node i ∈ R updates its state estimate at each time instant k with the probability of P i [k] . Note that with such updates, the algorithm remains fully distributed. Even the probabilities P i [k] need not be identical. Intuitively, this is in alignment with Assumption 3 as the regular node will update at least once within each consecutivek steps. With this strategy, the topology constraint required for resilient omniscience can be relaxed. This is because the smart spoofers cannot predict the update times in advance and need to use more of their spoofing capacity to make sure that the regular nodes, at each time step, receive and accept false data with fake identities; they cannot impersonate other nodes in a systematic manner in each consecutivek steps. In fact, regular nodes utilized randomization in update times as a defensive means against smart spoofers.
What follows is the modification of Theorem 3 for the suggested network with randomized updating strategy. Fig. 3 . A sample network that is 2(β + 1)f + 1 -robust w.r.t. λ j . Node h ∈ R 1 is impersonated by the smart spoofer s for the nodes in set R 3 .
Theorem 4. Resilient omniscience of a network with communication delays and asynchrony under the f -local smart spoofer model can be achieved using the proposed estimation scheme if each follower node i ∈ R, at each time instant k, updates using rule (5) with the probability of P i ∈ (0, 1] and if G is strongly 3(β + 1)f + 1 -robust w.r.t. S j , ∀λ j ∈ σ U (A), where β = β/k + 1.
Proof. Referring to Lemma 1, each smart spoofer was able to impersonate at most β regular nodes withink steps in case the smart spoofers knew when exactly each regular node updates its state estimate. Now, consider that each regular node i make an update at each time instant k randomly with a probability of P i [k] ∈ (0, 1]. Then, each smart spoofer s ∈ N i cannot predict when exactly the node i updates; so it has to impersonate the incoming neighbors of the node i for all the time steps within each consecutivek steps, that isk times. As a result, the smart spoofers need to dedicate more capacity to produce faulty data packets with the mimicked identities of the neighbors of the node i. Thus, the smart spoofers will be able to impersonate β/k regular nodes for any ofk steps and one regular node for a limited number of timesteps, i.e. less thank. In this situation, to ensure that the smart spoofers cannot impersonate any extra regular nodes, we define β = β/k + 1. Accordingly, similar to the proof of Theorem 3, the required topology constraint for omniscience based on the parameter β is strongly 3(β + 1)f + 1 -robust w.r.t. S j , ∀λ j ∈ σ U (A).
Remark 4.
Based on Lemma 1, we have β = (αk − 1)/k . On the other hand, we knowk ≥ 1. Therefore, it is concluded that β = α − 1 in the case of a synchronous network (k = 1) and β = α in an asynchronous network (k > 1).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present a simulation example to demonstrate how a smart spoofer can misbehave and how it can be restrained in a given network of distributed observers. In particular, we show why the constraints on the network topology, proposed in Theorems 2 and 3, are critical for achieving resilient omniscience under f -local smart spoofer model in the presence of asynchronous communications and delays.
To this end, consider the network illustrated in Fig. 3 . The directed edges of the graph represent all to one connections 4 . Omniscience of the sample network: the regular source nodes in R 1 asymptotically estimate z 1 using Luenberger observers. The follower nodes in R 2 and R 3 can asymptotically estimate z 1 despite of the efforts smart spoofer does for misleading them by impersonating the node h ∈ R 1 . They also estimate z 2 since there is no spoofing for λ 2 .
and edges pointing in both directions represent all to all connections. The network has three sets of regular nodes R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , and a smart spoofer s (f = 1). The capacity of s is assumed to be α = 1 and all of the nodes are supposed to make, at least, an update withink = 2 steps. Thus, the parameter is set as β = 1. There are 2(β + 1)f nodes in each of the sets R 1 and R 2 and 2(β + 1)f + 1 nodes in the set R 3 , where the nodes within each set are not connected. Furthermore, communication delays over the network are defined as follows:
, if (i ∈ R 3 and j ∈ R 2 ) 2, if (i ∈ R 2 and j ∈ R 3 ) or (i ∈ R 3 and j ∈ R 1 ) 1, if (i ∈ R 1 and j ∈ R 3 ) or (i ∈ R 3 and j = s) 0, if i = s and (j ∈ R 1 or j ∈ R 2 )
Note that the smart spoofer fully knows the dynamic system and the observation models of the regular nodes and calculates its own and the impersonated states estimations in a way that the targeting regular nodes fail to reach omniscience. Thus, to give a better intuition, we deal with the transformed dynamic system and states in our simulations; the original system can be analyzed accordingly. For sake of simplicity, we use the terms "send" and "receive" withẑ into the following diagonal system and initial state:
The first eigenvalue of the system (λ 1 = 1.02) is unstable and the second one (λ 2 = 1) is marginally stable. The observation model of the network system is assumed to be
The transformation of the observation model is given by
. This means that the nodes in R 1 are source nodes for λ 1 and followers for λ 2 as they can only detect λ 1 , the nodes in R 2 are source nodes for λ 2 and followers for λ 1 , and the nodes in R 3 are followers for both λ 1 and λ 2 . Also, the nodes in the set R 3 and the node s update at all time instants and the nodes in R 1 and R 2 update at time instants k = mk, m ∈ Z + . We present the simulation results in two test scenarios. In both scenarios, the smart spoofer just impersonate only one node in R 1 and only for the state z 1 . Thus, all the nodes of the network will accurately estimate the state z 2 . In scenario 1, we show that the follower nodes for λ 1 can asymptotically estimate z 1 even though the smart spoofer s tries to mislead the follower nodes but the network finally achieves omniscience. However, in scenario 2, the follower nodes cannot reach a true estimate of z 1 as the required topology constraint for estimation (Theorem 2) is not satisfied. Scenario 1. The smart spoofer sends the message χ s = 1 to all the nodes in R 3 to pretend that it is a parent node for λ 1 . Although the smart spoofer can impersonate a regular node during the SR-MEDAG construction phase, it decides not to do so and goes through the estimation phase. The initial estimates of z 1 for nodes in R 1 areẑ , on behalf of the node h = 1, h ∈ R 1 to the nodes in R 3 . As shown in Fig. 4 , all the regular nodes can estimate z 1 although the smart spoofer caused a deviation in the estimations of the nodes in R 3 (and accordingly the nodes in R 2 ) up to time instant k = 12. Note that the estimate value ofẑ h 1 [k] will not be filtered only if it converges to z 1 . In fact, referring to Lemma 3, estimate values of the smart spoofer are sandwiched by estimate values of the regular parent nodes, thanks to our proposed rule (5) and the network topology constraint discussed in Theorem 2.
Scenario 2. Here, the smart spoofer s sends a message χ s = 1 to the nodes in R 3 while it impersonates the node p = 1, p ∈ R 1 in the SR-MEDAG construction phase by setting the message χ p = 0, i.e. the node p cannot be a parent node of the nodes in R 3 for λ 1 . In other words, Algorithm 1 does not terminate in the case of λ 1 for the nodes in R 3 . In fact, the constraint on the network topology is not satisfied for the estimation of z 1 since the nodes in R 3 recognizes only 2(β + 1)f parent nodes for λ 1 . However, assume that the nodes in R 3 decide to start the estimation regardless of the termination of the SR-MEDAG construction phase. As a result, the smart spoofer is able to impersonate one more regular node of the set R 1 this time in the estimation phase. The initial estimates of z 1 are given asẑ , where k = mk, m ∈ Z ≥0 , on behalf of the node h = 1, h ∈ R 1 , to the nodes in R 3 . Fig. 6 shows the consequence of spoofing in the estimations. The initial estimate values of the nodes in R 2 and R 3 remain constant for all the future time. It is noteworthy that, not only the nodes in R 3 are affected by the spoofing, but the nodes in R 2 are also affected indirectly and none of them can reach omniscience for z 1 .
While we primarily analyzed the success or failure of the network omniscience in the transformed dynamic system, the main results are valid for the original dynamic system with different time histories of state values (Fig. 5 and Fig. 7 ).
VI. CONCLUSION
Combining the Byzantine adversarial strategies and spoofing as a misbehaving technique, we introduced a new type of cyber attack called smart spoofing. Then, we investigated the problem of distributed observer design for LTI systems in the presence of this attack which uses the asynchrony in communications to threaten the network. Using a two-step distributed mechanism, including a pre-executing algorithm for recognizing the trusted neighbors and a local-filtering algorithm for removing possible incorrect values induced by the adversarial nodes, the regular nodes can achieve resilient observation over so-called strongly robust graphs. We proposed resilient topology constraints on static and time-varying networks under the proposed adversarial threat. Numerical simulations with a sample network system validate our analytic results. The proposed designs are applicable to a vast range of networked cyber-physical systems. In our future studies, we consider resilient consensus problems prone to smart spoofing attacks.
